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Abstract 
Problem, research strategy, and findings: Conventional wisdom in the affordable housing 
industry and among affordable developers holds that subsidy layering is a source of 
disproportionately increased legal expenses in LIHTC deals. In this paper, I discuss the 
available literature on subsidy layering with the LIHTC program (last contributed to in 2000) and 
that literature’s relationship to the LIHTC program’s growth and development, before evaluating 
the 728 (nationwide) available Qualified Allocation Plans to establish the Georgia LIHTC 
program’s suitability as a representative case study. To investigate the layering-expenses 
relationship claim, I study both the national LIHTC database and a new database of twelve 
years’ of LIHTC applications in Georgia to empirically test the relationship between layers of 
additional subsidy and project costs. The lower-quality national data shows no statistically 
significant relationship is present between subsidy layers and total LIHTC allocation, while the 
higher-quality (if geographically limited) Georgia data shows a relationship between subsidy 
layers and legal costs is present, but one with a very small effect size -- less than one-third of a 
standard deviation.  
Takeaway for Practice: The available data suggests that developers considering adding 
subsidy layers may not need to be overly concerned with the risk of increased legal expenses, 
while affordable housing practitioners looking to lower LIHTC deal costs may want to focus 
elsewhere than a deal’s layers of subsidy. 
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Contesting Conventional Wisdom: The Link Between Subsidy Layering and Legal 
Expenses in the LIHTC Program 
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is the largest supply-side affordable 
housing subsidy in the nation. With $7.8 billion in budget authorization in 2016 and a thirty-year 
history of bipartisan support, recession resilience, and practical success, it is a popular topic for 
scholarly research in the housing field (Gramlich, 2016). The program’s lengthy, sometimes 
dramatic policy history and wide implementation has facilitated a great wealth of literature 
covering a variety of subtopics. One of the less-studied subtopics is the relationship between 
subsidy layering and legal costs in the LIHTC program, the subject this study explores. Subsidy 
layering (the introduction of additional sources of funds on top of the LIHTC) in general is a 
response to a financing gap, in which the developer must combine multiple forms of affordable 
housing subsidy in order to make a project financially feasible, and is a common feature of 
much affordable housing construction. Due to the small number and great age of the few 
LIHTC-subsidy layering studies available, their chronological relationships to the policy history 
of the LIHTC program and its development are important to consider to contextualize the 
studies’ findings and recommendations, as well as the nature of the present research gap given 
the program’s many changes since the most recently published study.  
 In this study, I use two connected data sources -- the national LIHTC placed-in-service 
database and a Georgia-specific LIHTC application database -- to pursue the question of 
whether the available data supports the presence of a relationship between subsidy layering 
and transaction costs (in the form of legal expenditures) in Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
projects. I find that the national dataset does not support the presence of a statistically 
significant relationship between subsidy layers and legal expenses, and that while the higher-
quality Georgia dataset does support the presence of such a relationship, it is very small in its 
effect size. These results suggest that, although further study of this issue is needed, the 
industry’s “conventional wisdom” that additional layers of subsidies disproportionately increase 
the complication and legal expenses of a LIHTC deal seems to be unfounded.  
First, I review the LIHTC program, its history, and its most frequently researched 
subtopics. Then, I discuss what literature already exists related to the question of the LIHTC 
program and subsidy layering, followed by a brief summary of major sources of layering for 
LIHTC projects. I then review the Georgia QAP and its Housing Finance Agency (HFA)’s 
suitability to act as a case study for the LIHTC program in general. Next, I discuss the specifics 
of the two datasets I employed, my methodology, and my results, before discussing the 
implications of those results in the conclusion section. 
The LIHTC Program and Subsidy Layering 
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit was created by the 1986 Cranston-Gonzales Tax 
Reform Act (often referred to simply as “TRA 86”) (Novogradac, 2016b). As Hays (2012, 231) 
puts it, “the 1986 Act had eliminated the ability of individual investors to claim ‘passive losses’ 
(i.e., the depreciation of the value of assets) as a deduction against regular income. Since 
passive losses had been a major financial prop for previous housing construction programs, 
there was great concern that investment in such programs would drop… LIHTC was enacted as 
a substitute for the loss of these tax breaks.” Indeed, some of the LIHTC creation process’s 
policy actors have observed that the program “wasn’t the driving force [of TRA 86]. The driving 
force was to end tax shelters, create lower rates and there were major issues with foreign 
taxes... [t]he credit was a big issue for people in housing or tax shelters, but that’s it” (Stanhope, 
2016). 
This initial disinterest also translated into weak support for the proposed LIHTC program. 
Despite “fl[ying] under the national radar” as a program, LIHTC did manage to stir up resistance 
– largely in the same policy circles it would later dominate (Stanhope, 2016). The Joint 
Committee on Taxation was against the idea, believing that the LIHTC program would simply 
serve as another tax shelter in a slightly altered form and let millionaires continue avoiding 
paying their “fair share.” Simultaneously, affordable housing advocates feared the loss of the 
existing affordable-housing tax shelter system, a main source of funding, and predicted the bill 
might end the nonprofit development industry (Stanhope, 2016). Indeed, after limping along with 
another one-year renewal in 1990 (in that year’s Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act), the 
LIHTC program finally lost budget authority, and its future was extremely unclear (GovTrack, 
2016c).  
Within this context of uncertain sustainability and housing-advocate hostility comes the first 
of the four extant articles on subsidy layering and LIHTC. Unsurprisingly, Stegman (1991) 
decries the LIHTC program as an example of the “growing inefficiencies in the production of 
low-income housing,” what he terms the “excessive costs of creative finance.” In what would 
later be termed a “seminal work” (Quercia, Rohe, & Levy, 2000), Stegman characterizes this 
early version of the LIHTC program as a “last resort” affordable housing finance program, 
plagued by high transaction costs (both in terms of production oversight and the inefficiencies 
inherent to the low credit prices of the time) and insufficient monitoring. He pejoratively terms 
the subsidy layering made necessary by those low prices “creative finance,” and cites that 
layering as evidence for the unsuitability of the LIHTC program as a policy – the idea being, that 
federal supply-side subsidies should instead be direct or near-direct. He further describes the 
concept of subsidy layering as an “ad hoc, costly, and potentially dangerous” response to a 
“pathological set of market conditions” for affordable housing brought about by the 1980s waves 
of devolved government and homelessness (Stegman, 1991, 358). Indeed, many of the 
complaints he cites against the LIHTC model – that it is inefficient, indirect, and has high 
transaction costs both financially and in person-hours – continue to be echoed to this day by 
many LIHTC critics (Rosenbaum, 2014; Valdez, 2016), and he even touches on regulatory 
misalignments and the tension between subsidy programs within the capital stack, each eager 
to “be the last with the least” (Stegman, 1991, 365). Stegman’s particular contribution comes in 
framing the LIHTC program itself as evidence of a larger over-reliance on creative financing 
(subsidy layering) approaches in the face of a hostile affordable housing funding environment. 
At the same time, some of his criticisms (such as the initial lack of basis boosts for high-cost 
areas and the inefficiencies of low credit pricing) have since been corrected, the number of 
subsidy sources in a normal project has decreased substantially from the average of five he 
observed (Stegman, 1991, 362), and his prediction of widespread year-15 conversion of 
affordable properties to market rate has largely been disproven (Schwartz & Melandez, 2008; 
Khadduri et al., 2012). While the continued (if reduced) reliance of LIHTC projects on gap 
financing (and therefore sometimes subsidy layering) (Machack, 2014) seems routine after thirty 
years of operation, at the time the identification of this connection was quite innovative, and has 
contributed to the discussion of the LIHTC program and housing finance generally ever since 
(Schwartz, 2014).  
As time wore on, ground-level advocates such as Local Initiatives Support Council President 
Paul Grogan, who advocated the LIHTC program as “the most successful federal housing 
program in history,” spent much of 1991 and 1992 drawing media attention to LIHTC’s 
successes, leading to positive pieces in major papers including the New York Times, Wall Street 
Journal, and many others (Erickson, 2006). After this positive press and the 1992 election, 
which resulted in a Democratic President and Congress, LIHTC was finally made permanent 
through 1993’s Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (GovTrack, 2016d). After a rocky half-
decade, LIHTC was here to stay, and the jump in the body of literature in the eight years before 
and after it was made permanent is significant (per a Google Scholar search, 60 versus 380 
LIHTC-centered articles). 
In contrast to Stegman’s (1991) more theoretical piece criticizing some of the policy 
underpinnings of the LIHTC program, the other subsidy-layering study of this early period is 
brief and implementation-oriented. Hykan (1994, 4) addresses the causes of financing gaps, 
such as high development costs in a project area, acknowledges the complexities of LIHTC 
finance, and outlines some of the “novel financing techniques” (a more generous term that is 
nonetheless reminiscent of Stegman’s derisive “creative finance”) employed to close the gap, as 
well as the major players, their motivations, and strategies to resolve conflict and gather enough 
sources of funding in order to complete the deal. This brief article is important as the first known 
instance of a research product intended to assist practitioners (as is now the case with a 
significant portion of the LIHTC literature being generated, particularly outside of formal 
journals). 
With the hurdle of permanence finally cleared, financial and political support for the LIHTC 
program rapidly consolidated. Credit prices rose in response to the new certainty of LIHTC as a 
long-term investment option, which increased program efficiency. LIHTC operated normally for 
the next several years, and when it was next modified in 2000, its power was only increased. 
Not only did 2001’s Consolidated Appropriations Act directly increase the per-capita allocation 
amount from $1.25 to $1.75 over two years, it also tied the per-capita allocation to inflation, 
which has resulted in the program’s current $2.35-per-person allocation (Govtrack, 2016e; 
Novogradac, 2016a). This expansion speaks to the confidence and prestige the LIHTC program 
cultivated in the decade since it had been originally scheduled to sunset. 
2000 also saw the two latest works on subsidy layering with LIHTC. The first is McClure’s 
(2000) practical analysis of LIHTC developments in Missouri to understand the subsidy layering 
profiles of properties from the first ten years of the program. This study is significant not only 
because it is the first piece in the body of LIHTC subsidy layering literature to study actual 
completed projects, but also because it examines properties ranging in time from the earliest, 
foundering years through significantly after the LIHTC program’s establishment, with most of its 
major programmatic tweaks accomplished and its implementers familiar and efficient with its 
operation. McClure sought to address some of the key criticisms of the LIHTC, complaints that 
largely persist to this day: that the program is unnecessarily complex and funnels subsidy not 
directly to low-income persons, but rather to developers (a point that McClure cites as being 
from Stegman [1991]). McClure (2000) found that the primary cause of the high level of subsidy 
layering observed – an average of 22% of funding in each project – was equity investors finding 
investing in LIHTC properties themselves (as opposed to the credits) unappealing. This 
circumstance meant, he argued, that syndication proceeds (the value that ‘selling’ LIHTC credits 
brings) replace part of the debt that would normally be required for a multifamily project (missing 
due to the worse debt coverage and loan-to-value ratios of affordable properties) and also 
weaken the equity-gathering capacity of the project without themselves offsetting the loss. While 
LIHTC’s capacity to generate syndication proceeds has improved with its credit pricing, the 
fundamental mismatch persists and is an important insight into the causes of subsidy layering in 
LIHTC projects. Also interesting in this piece is McClure’s observation that about a third of 
projects had two layers of subsidy, and another third three layers – substantially reduced from 
the five-layer average of Stegman’s (1991) sample. 
The second LIHTC subsidy layering article from 2000, and the most recent such study in the 
literature, is that of Quercia, Rohe, and Levy (2000). Another study of operating projects, this 
review of sources of financial viability for 36 nonprofit-developed LIHTC properties is even more 
clearly grounded in Stegman’s (1991) piece, terming it “seminal” and framing the new study as 
“extend[ing] Stegman’s work by examining the impacts of creative finance over time” (Quercia et 
al., 2000, 943). Contrary to Stegman’s gloomy outlook on creative finance, however, the authors 
found that the same complex funding structures that complicated, delayed, and cost-inflated 
LIHTC projects during their initial deal-making experienced both drawbacks (like complicated 
reporting requirements and difficulty in changing policies) and benefits (such as long-term 
relationships between organizations, improved community acceptance of the property, and 
enhanced technical skills of nonprofit developers’ staff) in the long term. One limitation of this 
study is its sole focus on nonprofit affordable housing developers, which produce deals with 
greater subsidy layering than for-profit-developed projects (see Hebert, Heintz, Baron, Kay, & 
Wallace, 1993). However, the article still offers a number of insights, “rais[ing] the question of 
whether it is possible to develop a coherent national housing policy that relies on creative 
finance, not by default, but by design,” and asking whether LIHTC can serve as that policy 
(Quercia et al., 2000, 945). The authors also make the point that “no one has examined the 
transaction costs in low-income housing developments financed by the traditional federal 
government–centered model relative to those relying on creative finance” up to that point, nor 
afterwards as far as the literature available reveals (Quercia et al., 2000, 946). In the course of 
their work, the authors argue that those high short-term transaction costs are worthwhile in that 
they yield the long-term benefits mentioned above, and recommendation that national housing 
policy be explicitly designed with the necessity of creative finance in mind, rather than merely 
allowing insufficient federal funding to make such subsidy layering de facto housing policy. 
For the majority of the 2000s, there were few major developments in LIHTC’s legislative 
history and no research into subsidy layering in LIHTC, perhaps in part due to the thinner debt 
coverage ratios many state Housing Finance Agencies (HFAs) pursued (making greater 
leveraging and commercial gap funding sources more acceptable) (Hart, 2016). However, when 
the housing bubble burst in 2007 and the rest of the economy crashed along with it, the future of 
the LIHTC program was left in serious jeopardy. Initially, the federal government attempted to 
use the LIHTC program to mitigate the disorder housing markets had fallen into, by including 
provisions within HERA (Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008) to expedite project 
approval, streamline LIHTC mortgage insuring, and loosen certain technical restrictions, as well 
as increasing LIHTC’s budget authority in 2008 and 2009 by 10% and setting a 9% floor for 
competitive credits (previously close to 7.5%) (GovTrack, 2016g). Unfortunately, despite the 
confidence in LIHTC these changes suggest, the program itself struggled, to the point of a 
number of deals approved in 2007 falling through due to developers’ inability to sell the credits 
awarded (Joint Center, 2009), and many in the industry feared the LIHTC program had suffered 
a fatal blow (Wood, 2009). However, contrary to the panicked predictions of some experts, once 
freefall was arrested and larger economic markets began to inch towards normality, the LIHTC 
program eventually self-corrected as well – as is to be expected for a policy with such a market-
driven design. 
The most significant change to the LIHTC program since HERA came not from the 
legislature, but rather the judicial branch, in Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs v The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (576 No. 13-1371, June 25th, 2015). In this 
case, the Supreme Court ruled that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968, meaning plaintiffs may sue state allocation agencies if they feel the 
agency’s allocation of LIHTC credits produces a disparate impact on a protected population. 
This heightened scrutiny level is strengthened by HUD’s new Affirmatively Further Fair Housing 
(AFFH) Tool, which gives interested parties a user-friendly, standardized graphical interface to 
track relevant Census data and create maps to more easily argue a disparate impact case. 
Unsurprisingly, this has resulted in a variety of new resources and studies, from federal 
guidance (IRS, 2016a; IRS, 2016b; Garcia-Diaz, 2016) to theoretical explorations 
(Seicshnaydre, 2017; McArdle, 2015; Connelly, 2016) to practical guides on how LIHTC should 
operate in light of these new factors (Eagle, 2017; Miller, Li, Li, & Zheng, 2016; Kao & 
Immergluck, 2016). 
Despite its origins as an ill-liked stopgap consequence of a tenuously related objective, the 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program has grown to be the largest supply-side affordable 
housing program in the nation and “the sun that all the other [affordable housing] programs 
revolve[] around,” housing more than 13.3 million Americans over its thirty years (Novogradac, 
2016b). The wealth of research the program has accrued further attests to its significance: a 
Google Scholar search on “LIHTC” returns over 3,000 results, while nearly every major social-
science database offers several dozen more. This makes the relative paucity of subsidy-layering 
studies even more jarring. Clearly, this is a significant gap in the literature, particularly given the 
changes that the Great Recession and LIHTC’s foundering therein wrought on many HFAs’ 
allocation approaches. 
 While not directly relevant to the LIHTC, there are a few studies on other affordable 
housing programs that shed some light on the issue of subsidy layering as a gap financing 
approach. One such study is Hebert, Heintz, Baron, Kay, and Wallace’s (1993) report on 
nonprofit housing development; in it, the authors discussed the role of subsidy layering (often a 
necessity for tight-margined nonprofit operations) in increasing both the administrative costs in 
completing the “deal” and the risk of project default. Referencing the above report, Koebel’s 
(1998) book on nonprofit housing echoed these findings through a variety of both survey and 
case studies by various authors. Likewise, Siglin’s (2008) much more recent survey of the 
intersection of FHA, HUD, and LIHTC programs echoed a near laundry-list of complaints on 
timeline mismatch, administrative costs, and technical incongruities. The issue of subsidy 
layering is one that has gotten more official attention within HUD-governed programs such as 
HOME and Project-Based Vouchers (PBVs). HOME receives regular updates to its policies on 
subsidy layering and underwriting, including a requirement that the participating jurisdiction re-
underwrite any deal including LIHTC, regardless of the state Housing Finance Agency’s existing 
underwriting efforts (HUD, 2015). PBVs have received even more scrutiny, with their already-
mandatory Subsidy Layering Review being the subject of both law and internal policy (Reardon, 
2010). The PBV rules also make passing mention of the LIHTC program, but both HOME and 
PBV regulations are sensibly focused on their own programs, leaving articles primarily focused 
on subsidy layering as a component of LIHTC development to remain scarce. Nor are the 
difficulties and complexities of subsidy layering between LIHTC and other programs lost on 
HUD’s experts: in the original handbook on combining HOME and LIHTC, HUD (1997, 2, 6, 8, 
9) writers describe several deviations from standard rules required to overcome program 
conflicts and even the much-updated 161-page guidebook issued in 2013 at one point states 
that “in some instances, in order to comply with the requirements of both programs, it may not 
be possible to designate a single unit as both HOME- and LIHTC-assisted” (HUD, 2013, 117). 
Similarly, numerous practitioners have complained of the difficulty and cost of chasing additional 
subsidies to close the financing gap, and their complicated and sometimes contradictory 
requirements (Machak, 2014; Siglin, 2008).  It is within this context that I undertook the 
subsequent study of subsidy layering within the LIHTC program, both nationally and in Georgia.  
Why Study Georgia’s LIHTC Experience? 
 While HUD does make available a large database of LIHTC properties across the nation, 
it does not contain the kinds of detailed financial information, such as development budgets, 
legal costs, and so forth, that are necessary to empirically study the cost impacts of subsidy 
layering on LIHTC deals. Therefore, to further pursue this question, I went in search of 
additional data and found Georgia’s LIHTC application archive. Georgia’s Department of 
Community Affairs is unique for being the only HFA in the nation to make full Excel files of its 
prior LIHTC applications publicly available through the internet; these applications are a rich 
trove of highly detailed project-level financial data spanning the universe of the past twelve 
years of LIHTC application activity. While a few studies have examined Georgia’s LIHTC 
program previously (Rushing et al., 2015; Sweaney et al., 2006), they have been limited in their 
interest examining program impacts within Georgia rather than using Georgia as a case study to 
examine the LIHTC program nationally. Indeed, Georgia’s LIHTC program on the whole acts as 
an exemplary case study, suitable for generalization, in three dimensions: its excellent data 
availability compared to other HFAs, its thorough QAP process and document, and its forward-
thinking policy inclusions.  
 Georgia’s superior data reliability is outlined above -- it offers 758 Excel files complete 
with sources and uses statements, pro formas, and more for each proposed LIHTC deal for the 
last twelve years. But rich data are not all Georgia has to offer LIHTC scholars as a case study. 
To ascertain the relative quality of Georgia’s QAP and the presence of literature-based policy 
recommendations across QAPs over time, I downloaded the extensive collection of QAPs 
available from industry website Novogradac & Company, which I then supplemented with 
careful inspection of each HFA’s website and additional web searches to compile a set of 728 
QAP documents from the year 2000 through 2017 for each of the 59 HFAs (58 active HFAs, 
plus American Samoa) for whom one or more QAPs were available, resulting in 788 state-years 
of content. As part of this collection process, I also noted the update pattern of the QAPs and 
the years of QAPs, years of award allocations, and any previous applications available on each 
HFA’s website. I then employed a specialized program to generate a page length report for 
each QAP’s PDF document (Table 1).  
Table 1. Georgia’s QAP Statistics 
 Georgia's Result; Rank of 59  
Search 
Terms 
Timeliness: Annual QAP Update Yes; 42% of HFAs N/A 
Thoroughness: Average Length 105 pages; 5th N/A 
Thoroughness: Competitive Pointsa Yes; 89% of HFAs "point" 
Transparency: Number of QAPs on own site 1996-2017; 3rd N/A 
Transparency: Years of awards on own site 1997-2016; 22nd N/A 
Transparency: Detailed applications on own site 
Only two HFAs, Georgia (12 years) & Texas 
(8 years), have detailed applications N/A 
 
a. Note that only QAPs that provided the scoring criteria or clearly referenced them (such as in a named appendix) 
were included. This figure is for all observed state-years of QAPs. 
 
This analysis revealed that Georgia generates updated QAPs annually, ensuring that the 
newest results of policy studies are incorporated rapidly and that developers have sharply 
limited opportunities to unfairly benefit from any “loopholes” that may emerge over time (Hart, 
2016), a practice that only 42% of HFAs maintain. Its QAPs are long and highly detailed; at an 
average of 105 pages, Georgia’s QAP ranks fifth in the nation for length, and is part of the 89% 
of state-years of QAPs that include detailed competitive points systems to guide developers’ 
choices. Georgia’s QAP process is also detailed and thorough, with the third-highest number of 
historical QAPs hosted on its own site (22), accompanied by twenty years of awards results 
(22nd nationally). All of this, paired with its openness to developer comment and its unique 
status as one of only two HFAs nationally to offer past applications, means Georgia’s QAPs are 
timely, thorough, and transparently developed. 
For the next stage of my analysis, I used Adobe Acrobat Pro to create a searchable 
index file from the collected QAP PDF files to be able to efficiently analyze them. I used targeted 
search terms to find the policies, detailed in Table 2.  




Rank (HFAs  
with Rank) Search Terms Supporting Citations 
Poverty De-concentration:  




Khadduri & Rodda, 2004; 
Muralidhara, 2006; Khadduri et 
al, 2006; Khadduri, 2013; Lubell, 
2013; Vogelsmeier, 2015; 
Rushing et al, 2015; National 
Housing Trust, 2015; Skuzinski 
et al, 2016; Neville, 2017 
Poverty De-concentration:  
No Local Approval 
Requirementa 2012; 27th (1) 
"local government  
support", "local 
support", "community 
support", "letter of 
support" 
Bookbinder et al, 2008; Ellen et 




concentration 2002; 6th (9) 
"concentration",  
"distribut", "proximity",  
"distance", "previous" 
Bookbinder et al, 2008; 
Khadduri, 2013; Ellen et al, 2015 
Poverty De-concentration: 
Mixed-Income Development 2000; 1st (5) "mixed", “market rate” Spotts, 2016; Smith, 2016 
Quality Siting: Location 
Efficiency / Transit-Oriented 
Development 2000; 1st (4) 
"public transit", 
"transp", "transit" 
TXDCA, 2010; Oppenheimer, 
2015; Nedwick and Burnett, 
2015; Spotts, 2016; Adkins et al, 
2017 
Quality Siting: Neighborhood 
Revitalizationb 2000; 1st (6) "revitaliz" 
Khadduri & Rodda, 2004; 
Khadduri, 2013; Spotts, 2016 
Accessibility: Affirmative 
Marketing 2006; 26th (2) 
"affirmative", 
"marketing" 
Bookbinder et al, 2008; Haberle, 
Gayles, and Tegeler, 2012 
Accessibility: Supportive 




Gold, Klugar, & Schwartz, 2006; 
Bishop & Ng, 2013; Wingren, 
2016; Clary, 2017 
Long-Term Investment:  
Green Building 2000; 1st (8) 
"green", "energy eff", 
"sustainab" 
Tassos, 2007; Shear, 2008; 
Spotts, 2016; Madisen et al, 
2016 
Long-Term Investment: 
Preservation of / Extended 
Affordabilityc 2000; 1st (11) "extended", "preserv" 
Nelson & Sorce, 2013; National 
Housing Trust, 2015; Williams, 
2015; Criswell and Guin, 2017 
 
a. Due to difficulty of proving what isn't there, if a phrase appeared in the most recent QAP, the HFA was assumed 
to have failed this metric. Note that I also included the term "resolution" when confirming the lack of a requirement. 
b. The original text of the law requires that preference be given to any project that "contributes to a concerted 
community revitalization plan" (26 U.S.C. § 42). Accordingly, I only considered HFAs to meet this metric if they 
required something beyond just 'a plan' – that it be an independent plan, that it be a locally-approved plan, that it be 
in an already-designated zone, etc.  
c. The original text of the law requires that preference be given to "projects obligated to serve qualified tenants for 
the longest periods" (26 U.S.C. § 42). Accordingly, I only considered HFAs to meet this metric if they offered specific 
incentives, above and beyond this general precept, for longer affordability (such as point schedules), and/or if they 
explicitly incent preserving existing affordable housing (such as through set-asides, competitive points, etc). 
 
In completing this analysis, I found that not only are the process and specifications of 
Georgia’s QAP among the top tier of HFAs nationwide, its contents are also forward-thinking 
and in general highly compliant with key research-based recommendations. Georgia was one of 
the first recorded HFAs to include seven of the ten key policy elements identified by the 
literature, by providing incentives for: high-amenity areas, mixed-income development, location-
efficient/transit-oriented development, substantive neighborhood revitalization, supportive 
housing, green/sustainable building practices, and preservation of affordable housing for the 
longest possible time. For the remaining three initiatives, Georgia was either an early mover 
(affordable housing de-concentration), or in the middle of the pack (removing a local approval 
requirement and requiring affirmative marketing, 27th place each). Given the high quality of 
Georgia’s QAP process and document as demonstrated by these QAP analyses, Georgia 
serves as a good case study to suggest the nation-wide relationship of subsidy layering and 
legal costs.  
Data and Methodology: Two Datasets, One Question 
This paper relies on two separate but related data sources: the national LIHTC 
database, and a Georgia-specific application database. The national LIHTC database is a 
resource provided by HUD, available at https://lihtc.huduser.gov/ and spanning 1987 through 
2015. This database features a universe of 43,092 properties that have been placed in service, 
with 96 fields of ownership, locational, and project information for each. However, its data are 
notoriously incomplete; only 54% of properties include the allocation amount of the project, with 
absences skewed towards older allocation years (see Figure 1) when the program was 
unfamiliar to the Housing Finance Agencies implementing it and reporting standards were not 
yet firmly established. Additionally, 7% of properties lacked allocation year information. Even for 
the subset with both year and allocation information, many of the other fields suffer from other 
gaps and inaccuracies, making any rigorous analysis of this dataset potentially perilous. 
However, the richness of even limited subsets of this dataset make it worthwhile for its potential 
to suggest relationships and trends that merit further exploration. 
Figure 1. Histogram of the Percent of Allocation Information Present per Year 
 
This paper’s research question depends heavily on allocation and other financial mechanisms; 
observations without an allocation amount could not be used. However, as the histogram above 
shows, the absences are non-random, following a clear annual pattern. In order to mitigate this 
issue, I used two extracts of the data: one from 1996 – 2012 (allocation present in more than 
50% of observations) and a stricter 2005 – 2012 period (completeness above 70%). In order to 
further prepare the data, I renamed and recoded the relevant fields to be more intuitive and in 
some cases to simplify the information present (such as collapsing categories with very few 
observations). Most notably, I restricted the Layers categorical variable to 0, 1, and 2 due to the 
very small population of properties with more than two layers; these were collapsed into the “2” 
category. I inflation-adjusted all dollar amounts to reflect 2016 dollar values and calculated the 
amount of LIHTC dollars going to each unit of a project as LIHTCDol_Unit. 
The dependent variable for this dataset was LIHTCDol_Unit (ranging from $9.84 to 
$745,847.60), as an approximation of the total project costs (White and England-Joseph, 1997), 
which additional subsidy layers should increase. To prevent project characteristics from skewing 
the results, I also included location (rural/urban), construction type (new construction/other), 
population targeted (family/other), developers’ nonprofit status (yes/no) and the year as control 
variables. Finally, I performed the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity, 
and corrected for it with robust standard errors. My results were as follows. While I initially 
tested the full period of usable data (1996 – 2012), I found that Layers were insignificant and the 
earlier years did not meaningfully improve the predictive power of the model. Therefore, I 
proceeded to analyze just the period from 2005 – 2012 (Table 3). 
Table 3. Regression Results for National LIHTC, 2005 – 2012 
LIHTCDol_Unit Beta Robust Std. Err. t Sig. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Rural 3120.53 1059.667 2.94 0.003 1043.327, 5197.732 
Type -7021.993 526.5168 -13.34 0.000 -8054.093, -5989.893 
Target 295.1938 257.7694 1.15 0.252 -210.0962, 800.4839 
Nonprofit 60.17769 490.7035 0.12 0.902 -901.7191, 1022.075 
Layers: 1 932.5629 624.056 1.49 0.135 -290.737, 2155.863 
Layers: 2 381.5295 966.7377 0.39 0.693 -1513.509, 2276.568 
Year: 2006 1150.902 504.4768 2.28 0.023 162.0057, 2139.797 
Year: 2007 1402.514 683.9933 2.05 0.040 61.72214, 2743.305 
Year: 2008 3843.665 718.4517 5.35 0.000 2435.327, 5252.003 
Year: 2009 4843.634 628.161 7.71 0.000 3612.287, 6074.981 
Year: 2010 6005.427 654.6036 9.17 0.000 4722.246, 7288.608 
Year: 2011 5252.946 1059.905 4.96 0.000 3175.277, 7330.614 
Year: 2012 9108.171 1697.272 5.37 0.000 5781.11, 12435.23 
Constant 12107.05 444.0292 27.27 0.000 11236.65, 12977.45 
 
Layers were still insignificant in this iteration of the model, which has a meager R2 of 0.0341 – 
indicating that the factors selected are not, in fact, predictive of the LIHTC expenditure per unit 
as conventional wisdom would hold. Combined, these facts suggested a discrepancy between 
the data found here and the developer view of additional subsidy layers as disproportionately 
increasing costs; however, there were clear limitations to this dataset as discussed above, and 
the dependent variable was only a weak proxy for the increased legal costs predicted by 
anecdote. Therefore, I explored a richer (if more geographically limited) dataset to further 
investigate this question: the Georgia LIHTC application archive. 
As mentioned above, Georgia’s Department of Community Affairs is unique for being the 
only HFA in the nation with full Excel files of prior applications publicly available through the 
internet. At the time of writing found at http://www.dca.ga.gov/housing/HousingDevelopment/ 
programs/OAH_GORAcoreApps.asp, these documents span from 2005 to 2016 and represent 
both successful and unsuccessful applications for funding, a population of 758 total applications. 
These applications include detailed project information, such as development entities, project 
specifications, sources and uses of funding, pro formas, and more. From these files, I 
constructed a database of LIHTC applications in Georgia for the past 12 years. From the legal 
costs and development budgets, I constructed the dependent variable PerLegalTot, the fraction 
that legal costs represent of the total development budget, which ranged from 0.2% to 5.8% of 
all expenses. After coding the categorical variables, I selected an initial set of possible 
independent variables that the data itself and/or the literature on LIHTC financing suggested 
might be relevant to the total development budget or its legal costs, as shown in Table 4, as well 
as the key Layers variable of interest, discussed at length in the previous literature review. I 
then performed descriptive statistics on these potential variables to determine which appeared 
to have meaningful differences of legal fees between categories. 
Table 4: Control Variables Considered to Potentially Impact Legal Expenses  
Variable Definition Reason Support 
QCT_DDA QCT/DDA status is a 
statutorily-defined 
quality (by HUD) based 
on need 
This status makes projects eligible for a 
“basis boost” (increase in maximum 
credits awarded) of up to 30%, based 
on area cost and/or need. 
White & England-
Joseph, 1997; Lang, 
2012; HUD, 2017 
Rural Rural or Urban location 
as defined by the USDA 
Rural areas tend to have both lower 
construction costs and to have policy-
based set-asides. 
Gustafson & Walker, 
2002; Mitchell & 
McKinzie, 2009 
Type Construction type: New 
Construction or Other 
(includes adaptive 
reuse, rehabilitation, and 
acquisition-
rehabilitation)  
Deals involving existing structures -- 
especially if there is to be an ownership 
change -- are significantly more 





Nonprofit Developer is a nonprofit 
(or is working closely 
with a nonprofit partner) 
Nonprofit developers have historically 
had to rely on more creative (and 
complicated) financing approaches. 
England-Joseph, 
1999; McClure, 2000 
Award Whether or not an 
application received an 
allocation (award) 
I wanted to be certain that there was 
not something systematically deficient 
about the financials of projects that did 
not receive awards. 
LIHTC’s design 
means only the best 
deals receive funding 
awards. 
Num_Units The number of units in a 
property 
Larger properties require more 
expensive construction methods. 
Azoff, 2009; 
Braunstein, 2016 
PerMarketRate Percent of market-rate 
units out of all units in 
the property 
The presence of market rate units might 
complicate the project’s development or 
change its placement. 
HUD, 2003 
Target The population targeted 
by the proposed 
development: Family, 
Housing For Older 
Persons, or Other 
Housing developed for different 
populations may require different and/or 
more amenities, and may also affect 
location and therefore cost. 
White & England-
Joseph, 1997; 
Gustafson & Walker, 
2002; Newman & 
Schnare, 1997 
DevExperience Developer experience, 
as measured through 
the total number of 
applications submitted 
More experienced developers might 
have standing agreements and/or in-
house lawyers, lowering costs. 
Developer experience 
is a common QAP 
threshold factor. 
Year The year of application This variable reflects both 
programmatic changes within Georgia’s 
administration of LIHTC and larger 
market changes, such as the crash  
Hart, 2016; Joint 
Center, 2009 
 
Based on the descriptive statistics, I believed that year, nonprofit, location, construction 
type, number of units, population targeted, and layers were likely to be the most relevant. Out of 
an abundance of caution, I also included developer experience and award status in the final 
model, since their potential to matter was theoretically strong and could have a large effect on 
the results if significant. I again tested for heteroscedasticity and corrected it via robust standard 
errors. The results of this analysis are in Table 5 below. 
Table 5. Regression Results for Georgia LIHTC, 2005 – 2016 
PerLegalTot Beta Robust Std. Err. t Sig. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Rural -0.0014317 0.0006108 -2.34 0.019 -0.0026308, -0.0002327 
Type 0.0008384 0.0006163 1.36 0.174 -0.0003716, 0.0020484 
Target: HFOP -0.0015342 0.0004378 -3.5 0.000 -0.0023937, -0.0006747 
Target: Other 0.0012882 0.0007533 1.71 0.088 -0.0001906, 0.002767 
Nonprofit 0.0006473 0.0004737 1.37 0.172 -0.0002826, 0.0015772 
Num_Units -0.0000406 8.42E-06 -4.82 0.000 -0.0000572, -0.0000241 
Layers: 1 0.0015175 0.0004614 3.29 0.001 0.0006116, 0.0024234 
Layers: 2 0.0016816 0.0008111 2.07 0.038 0.0000893, 0.0032739 
Year: 2006 -0.0004166 0.0010083 -0.41 0.680 -0.002396, 0.0015628 
Year: 2007 0.0009375 0.0012941 0.72 0.469 -0.001603, 0.003478 
Year: 2008 0.000693 0.0010062 0.69 0.491 -0.0012823, 0.0026684 
Year: 2009 -0.0001841 0.0010244 -0.18 0.857 -0.0021952, 0.001827 
Year: 2010 0.0006552 0.0009933 0.66 0.510 -0.0012948, 0.0026052 
Year: 2011 0.0027067 0.0010879 2.49 0.013 0.0005709, 0.0048426 
Year: 2012 0.0013746 0.001104 1.25 0.213 -0.0007927, 0.003542 
Year: 2013 -0.000913 0.0009769 -0.93 0.350 -0.0028309, 0.0010049 
Year: 2014 -0.000876 0.0010657 -0.82 0.411 -0.0029682, 0.0012162 
Year: 2015 -0.0014873 0.0010058 -1.48 0.140 -0.003462, 0.0004873 
Year: 2016 -0.00155 0.0009594 -1.62 0.107 -0.0034335, 0.0003334 
DevExperience -0.0000155 0.0000233 -0.66 0.507 -0.0000612, 0.0000303 
AwardStatus 0.0004339 0.0004149 1.05 0.296 -0.0003807, 0.0012485 
Constant 0.0166088 0.0013349 12.44 0.000 0.013988, 0.0192295 
 
These results revealed several notable differences compared to those from the roughly similar 
national LIHTC regression (2005-2012). Immediately noticeable was the improved explanatory 
power of the Georgia model, with an R2 of 0.1475 (versus the national’s 0.0341), which while 
not exceptional was still suitable for a small population with high variance (Moksony, 1990; 
Gould, 2003; Ford, 2015). Type became insignificant and Rural became less significant, while 
one of the targeting options (Housing for Older Persons, as compared to Family) became 
significant and Nonprofit status became much less insignificant (0.172, versus the national’s 
0.902). None of the Year results were significant, suggesting the higher-quality data avoided the 
quality-based noise driving Year significance in the national dataset. DevExperience and 
AwardStatus (only available in the Georgia dataset) were confirmed as not being significant, as 
expected, while Num_Units was highly significant, suggesting that the unreliability of this field 
(which drives the dependent variable LIHTCDol_Unit) in the national dataset may be 
contributing to that model’s poor explanatory power.  
Most importantly, Layers showed considerable statistical significance, in stark contrast to 
the national model and more in line with anecdote-based expectations. However, while the 
significance was high, the effect size was not. For the 2005-2012 national dataset, the 
LIHTCDol_Unit dependent variable ranged from $13.61 to $745,847.60 with a standard 
deviation of $24,361.23. For the 2005-2016 Georgia dataset, the PerLegalTot dependent 
variable ranged from 0.00203 to 0.0581796 with a standard deviation of 0.0058593. This means 
that the effect size ($932.56 for one layer, $381.53 for two or more) suggested by the national 
dataset was 0.038 and 0.016 standard deviations, respectively. The Georgia effect size (0.0015 
for one layer, 0.0017 for two or more), by contrast, was 0.26 and 0.29 standard deviations, 
respectively. This is a much more significant effect in terms of the layers themselves, especially 
when compared to the national dataset, but ultimately, adding one layer only resulted in a 0.15 
percentage point increase in legal fees as a percentage of the total budget, and the impact of an 
additional layer beyond the first was only 0.02 percentage points. Clearly, the standard narrative 
on the subsidy layering-legal cost relationship and the data disagree. 
Limitations, Conclusions, and Opportunities for Future Research 
There are certainly limitations to the claims that can be made based on the data 
employed here. While analysis of Georgia’s QAPs shows that it is an excellent case-study HFA 
from with the LIHTC realm, it is entirely possible that there are other factors, such as economic 
position or state laws, that make Georgia non-representative for LIHTC’s operation across the 
nation. The Georgia model’s relatively meager R2 may also reflect some cost-explaining factor 
not detectable with existing data, such as changes in construction costs over time or between 
building sites, which even commercial data sources do not closely track (Grant, 2014; Gordian, 
2017). Simultaneously, the low quality of the data available in the national LIHTC database 
required the use of a very small subset of observations (ultimately, only 20% of the whole), and 
the database’s tendency towards errors and nonrandom omissions weaken its ability to shed 
light on patterns in LIHTC practice. While the consonance of findings between the national-level 
analysis and that of Georgia allay these concerns somewhat, suggesting that the two datasets 
are indeed pointing in the same general direction, the strength of the claim of Georgia’s 
representational capacity must remain mitigated nonetheless.  
Future studies could use the eight years of applications that Texas makes available to 
build a LIHTC application database parallel to the one I have constructed for Georgia in order to 
perform similar analyses. Texas has a QAP that, while not updated annually, is fairly long 
(average of 69 pages), detailed (has explicit points), highly accessible (19 years of QAP and 18 
of allocations on the HFA site), and policy-forward, with first or second-place rankings for all 
policy criterion other than Local Government Support (still required). Texas’s HFA has also been 
the focus of a landmark Supreme Court case (Texas Department of Housing and Community 
Affairs vs The Inclusive Communities Project Inc, 2015) that found disparate impact claims 
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and challenged HFAs to rethink their QAP 
inclusions. These factors mean that Texas might be a particularly intriguing case to explore, 
particularly when contrasted and compared with Georgia’s results for the same period. Ideally, 
future researchers might be able to gain access to even better data sources, such as LIHTC 
applications in states that do not currently make them available and/or completed project 
financials, in order to get an even more reliable picture of the nation-wide relationship between 
subsidy laying and legal expenditures for LIHTC deals. Finally, the national database could be 
cleaned and its missing and inaccurate fields corrected, making national-level analyses 
significantly more reliable than they currently can be. 
Nevertheless, this current study does offer some potentially important insights to the field 
of LIHTC scholarship. The national data suggests that there may be no statistical relationship at 
all between subsidy layering and the total costs of a project. The Georgia data refine this finding 
and show that, in accordance with the conventional wisdom of affordable housing developers 
and the affordable housing industry, there is a positive relationship between layers and legal 
expenses -- increasing the layers of subsidy does increase the amount of legal expenditures on 
a LIHTC deal, all else being equal. However, these findings also show that the absolute amount 
of the increase is very small, particularly when moving from one to more-than-one layer atop the 
constant LIHTC substrate. This suggests the complication of subsidy layering described is at 
least not bearing itself out in the legal fees and costs deals require, and the precise amount of 
these costs vary mostly for unrelated reasons, such as the population targeted, the rural nature 
of the property, and other factors -- a finding that is harmonious with the national-level data’s 
lack of support for a layers-cost relationship. When the datasets are combined, this research 
suggests that developers worried about rising legal expenses may wish to look elsewhere than 
subsidy layering to rein them in, and that, other hesitations about “creative financing” aside, the 
legal complication component of the argument against subsidy layering does not seem to have 
a strong foundation in the data.  
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